# Analysis of the of Socio-Political, Economic and Settlement Policy Related Effects of Racial Segregation in South Africa

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**Abstract** The paper deals with the socio-political, economic and settlement policy related effects of racial segregation in South Africa. Nowadays, not much has remained of the optimistic spirit of optimism from the Mandela era. The extent of nepotism, corruption and enrichment under subsequent ANC governments was so extensive that there is talk of 'state capture'**.** The increasing impoverishment to the point of starvation of low-income earners especially during the Corona pandemic led to the radicalisation of society and the number of violent protests and riots increased. Race relations have also deteriorated. The black South African population feels abandoned by the government and partly transfers this resentment to the white South African population; the number of assaults is increasing. White South Africans have felt increasingly marginalised in public life and deprived of career advancement opportunities since 1994 due to the governments' 'affirmative action'. The complaint that "there used to be too little white and now there is too little black" leads to the statement: "Apartheid today is against whites".

**Keywords:** apartheid, South Africa vocational education, health system, settelement policy, analysis

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## 1 Introduction

The Republic of South Africa is located in the south of the African continent and has a size of 1.2 million km². South Africa is called the 'rainbow nation' because many ethnic groups of different cultures and ethnicities live together in this country. The population in 2021 was approximately 60.1 million people; of these, approximately 81% are black South Africans, 7.8% white South Africans, 8.8% Coloureds (mixed-race South Africans) and just under 3% Asians (cf. BMZ 2023a; cf. Urmersbach 2022a). There are eleven official languages in South Africa, including Zulu, Xhosa and, as a 'legacy' of colonial history, Afrikaans[1] and English. The racial segregation practised for decades, the so-called apartheid, not only shaped the coexistence of people in this country until its official abolition in 1994, but still shapes it today, almost 30 years later.

The word 'apartheid' itself comes from Afrikaans and initially means - derived from the adjective apart (separate, particular) - literally separation or segregation (cf. Dadalos/Apartheid, p. 1f.). In South African history, apartheid means comprehensive racial segregation, especially the discrimination and oppression of the black majority of the South African population by the white minority.

The 'year of birth' of apartheid in South Africa is considered to be the year 1948, when the Burmese National Party, after winning parliamentary elections, enshrined a policy of 'separate development' in law (cf. Pabst 2008, p. 82; cf. Schepers 2013, p. 1). Nevertheless, apartheid has its roots already in the XVII century and arose as a result of the local settlement of Dutch and later also British. However, the victory of the Burmese party in 1948 meant a strong increase in the radicality, expansion and 'perfection' of the racial segregation and discrimination that had existed until then (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 72).

Finally, in 1950, the Population Registration Act was passed. The Act prescribed the classification of all South Africans in a racial register. The classification into a race (white South Africans, black South Africans, Coloureds and later Indians and

[1] Africaans is the language of the Dutch settlers who settled as farmers (Dutch: Boers) in the XVII century, cf. Dadalos/Apartheid, p. 1.

Asians) was based on partly arbitrary[2] criteria, such as appearance, reputation, social behaviour. The racial affiliation was recorded in a passport that every South African had to carry (cf. Dadalos/Classification p. 1.). Classification as a particular race had comprehensive consequences for those affected in the socio-political and economic spheres as well as in terms of settlement policy (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 74; cf. Dadalos/Classification p. 1). In this respect, a "cappuccino society - black at the bottom, white at the top" as pointedly described by the long-time South Africa correspondent Johannes Dieterich (Dieterich 2017, p. 29, translation of the author) was consolidated and further developed.

Any initially non-violent protests by the black African resistance movement were suppressed from the beginning with massive police violence. In 1960, for example, an unarmed demonstration led by the African National Congress (ANC) against the pass laws in Sharpenville ended in a massacre in which 69 participants were killed. As a result, the ANC was banned, the leading activists, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested and finally sentenced to life imprisonment (cf. Bpb 2022, p. 4).

In 1961, the government initiated the withdrawal from the Commonwealth and declared South Africa a republic. In the course of the 1970s, demonstrations, protests but also acts of sabotage, bombings, strikes and boycotts against the apartheid regime increased (cf. Bpb 2022, p. 4).

In the 1980s, foreign policy pressure on the apartheid regime intensified, among other things through the imposition of economic sanctions of varying severity and the condemnation of apartheid as a 'crime against humanity' by the UN. But domestic political pressure was also building up for the abolition of the apartheid regime, as its maintenance was becoming increasingly costly (cf. Bpb 2022, p. 4f.; cf. von Soest 2020, p. 2). As a result, initial talks were held with the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and the then acting president, Frederik Willem de Klerk, initiated a gradual dismantling of apartheid policy from 1989 onwards. To this end, various apartheid laws were annulled and the ban on the ANC was lifted. Nelson Mandela - as well as other political prisoners - were released after 27 years of imprisonment. Remarkably, de Klerk's reform policy found approval in broad sections of society: In a

[2] For example, the Japanese were assigned to the white race for reasons of trade policy, cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 74.

referendum in 1992, almost 69% of white, eligible to vote South African citizens supported the end of apartheid. In 1994, the first free, equal and fair elections took place and after the clear victory of the ANC with 62% of the votes (cf. Bpb 2022, p. 2; cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 100f. and p. 108f.), Nelson Mandela[3] was elected South Africa's first black president on 10 May 1994.

The new government under Mandela was determined to right the wrongs of apartheid but to reconcile society under the motto: "forgive but do not forget". The 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' established for this purpose under the leadership of Bishop Desmond M. Tutu is still regarded today - despite some criticism - as a model for peace processes worldwide (cf. von Soest 2020, p. 4; cf. Bpb 2022, p. 6). Despite this success achieved at the political level, many of the legacies of apartheid continue to have an impact today.

## 2 The socio-political, economic and settlement consequences of apartheid

In the literature, apartheid is divided into 'petty apartheid' and 'grand apartheid'. Petty apartheid' meant 'small-scale' interventions and regulations at the level of socio-political and economic life; the term 'grand apartheid' is closely associated with the establishment of separate territories for the black population (homelands), i.e. settlement policy (cf. Hagemann 2018, pp. 73 and 76f.).

### 2.1 Socio-political consequences of apartheid

The strict racial segregation and accompanying social discrimination against black South Africans extended to all areas of daily life. The encroachment on privacy consisted in the prohibition of interracial marriages (Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949) and the prohibition - and punishment - of any interracial intimate relationships (Immorality Act of 1957; (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 74*).* With the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act enacted in 1953, segregation by race was enforced in all public institutions: For example, public toilets, banks, restaurants, beaches and parks were segregated, even park benches were designated separately

[3] Both de Klerk and Nelson Mandela received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013. In 2013, Mandela died at the age of 95.

and there were separate compartments in public transport (cf. Hefeker/Menck 2002, p. 29).

However, racial segregation also had serious social effects, especially in the health and education sectors.

The health system was characterised by diametric differences in medical care: A 'white doctor', for example, cared for an average of 330 white South Africans, while a 'black doctor' had 91,000 black South Africans as patients. The conditions in the homelands were even more catastrophic, with some of them lacking even basic medical care. Accordingly, the health condition of many black South Africans was desolate and their life expectancy was significantly lower than that of the white population. The infant mortality rate was particularly high. In 1979, between 20 and 30% of all children in Homelands died before their first birthday as a result of infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, cholera, thypus, as well as malnutrition (cf. Dadalos/Society, p. 2; cf. Larson 2019, p. 7).

In 1953, the Bantu Education Act introduced separate schooling and administration by race, with no compulsory education for black South African children (Cf. Thobejane 2013, p. 2).

The role of school education was described by the then Minister of Native Affairs and later Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd in 1953 as follows:

"There is no place for [the Bantu] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour [...] What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?" (Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 36).

This statement illustrates the core idea of South African apartheid: The education of black South Africans was to prepare them for their role as the cheapest possible labour force to perform menial tasks and heavy physical work. Numerous missionary schools, which had previously produced comprehensively educated pupils (including Nelson Mandela; cf. Dadalos/Society, p. 2; cf. Schuster 2011, p. 44f.), also had to limit themselves to these low educational standards.

This view resulted in different levels of education expenditure for black and white South Africans: At the end of the 1960s, education expenditure for white South African pupils was 16 times higher than for a black South African pupil and this tendency remained for the next decades (cf. Schuster 2011, p. 45). Accordingly, the 'black schools' were very rudimentarily furnished, without heating, often without sanitary facilities, hardly equipped with teaching materials such as books, television and video equipment. The teachers themselves were less well paid and less well trained. Specifically, at the 'white schools' over 95% of the teachers had a teaching certificate, at the 'black schools' only 15%, and in some cases they even had no school-leaving qualifications (cf. Dadalos/Society), p. 4f.; cf. Schuster 2011, p. 45). Communication difficulties during lessons due to the ethnic diversity of the classes and very long distances to school, i.e. more than an hour's walk, deepened the inequality regarding educational opportunities even more (cf. Dadalos/Society, p. 5; cf. Schuster 2011, p. 55).

The neglect and discrimination of the black South African population had significant consequences: In 1980, 48% of the black South African population had not attended school; in 1995, 13.1% of the total population were illiterate without any schooling and 17.3% dropped out of school before completing grade 7 (cf. Rehklau 2013, p. 313).

The unequal starting chances in education also continued in the field of higher education: since 1959, universities were also segregated by race and accordingly the educational quality of the 'black colleges' was inferior (cf. Rehklau 2013, p. 307).

In 1994, the new government set itself the goal of "a better life for all" (Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 39). The discrimination and inequality of Petty Apartheid were largely lifted. In the health sector, the government's expenditures brought, among other things, the extension of life expectancy by 10 years. At present it is about 64 years. However, one major problem still exists: the AIDS epidemic, which was neglected for decades. Approx. 20 % of 15 to 49 year-olds are currently HIV-positive, which means that health expenditure is growing (cf. BMZ 2023b, p. 3f.).

In order to create equal educational conditions for all citizens, racial segregation in the education system was abolished and compulsory education was introduced. The state's financial allocations to the education sector were significantly increased (approx. 20% of the budget), with poorer areas being granted more support. The National School Nutrition Programme and the shortening of school routes through free school buses are other successful measures taken by the government. Despite the massive investments, the 'legacy' of apartheid is so serious that the different governments have not yet succeeded in closing the gap between formerly disadvantaged and favoured groups (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 41; cf. Rehklau 2013, p. 315f.).

One reason for this is the continued existence of school fees, which serve as a source of funding for the school system. Schools in economically better off, former 'white areas' charge higher school fees. This gives them the opportunity to invest more financial resources in infrastructure and equipment, to positively influence teacher-pupil ratios or to hire better qualified teachers. Schools in economically weak regions can often be declared 'fee free schools' (in 2008, more than half of all pupils went to such schools). However, the state subsidies do not compensate for the loss of school fees. Accordingly, the quality of education in these schools is significantly lower, and the backlog from the apartheid era cannot be made up at present (cf. Schuster 2011, p. 54; cf. Rehklau 2013, p. 315). The quality of education is also affected by teachers who are not very motivated, skip classes and are protected by strong trade unions. [4]

The financial barrier to accessing the better schools has been formally removed, i.e. pupils from low-income families can and are exempted from school fees; in practice, however, the distance to these schools continues to exist as a barrier to appropriate school attendance. In this context, the poor image of many state schools is leading to a boom in public schools (cf. Rehklau 2013, p. 315; cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 41).Despite much progress, the high number of school drop-outs in South Africa continues to be referred to as an 'education crisis': Almost half of the children leave

[4] According to a study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published in 2019, almost 20% of teachers do not appear in schools on Mondays or Fridays. In (state) schools attended predominantly by black children, teachers teach an average of 3.5 hours/day, while in formerly 'white' schools the figure is 6.5 hours, cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 41.

school before completing their final exams, the majority of whom come from poor areas, with girls being particularly affected. In the international comparative test on reading ability (PIRLS), South Africa came in last place in 2016, with almost 80% of pupils unable to read properly in grade 4 (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 41; cf. Humanium o.J., p. 4).

On a positive note, however, the majority of young people between 20 and 34 have now attained a higher level of education than their parents. The number of students has risen to more than 1.1 million, and more than 700 000 of the students are now black South Africans. In this context, the state supports students from low-income families with extensive and low-interest loans; since 2018, even predominantly with scholarships (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 39; Schepers 2013, p. 2). The regional distribution is problematic, i.e., in the poorer provinces, such as the Eastern Cape, only 14% of students are eligible to study (cf. Humanium n.d., p. 4). There is also criticism that despite the increase in the number of university graduates, young people are considered 'unprepared' for the world of work. In addition, the number of dropouts is high. Even with a degree, many young adults - due to the economic situation - continue to have problems finding a job (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 39).

### 2.2 Economic consequences of apartheid

A large part of the racial segregation measures in the economic sphere were already enacted before 1948. The laws were primarily intended to ensure that white workers were protected from 'black competition'. The Native Lands Act of 1913 prohibited black South Africans from owning land outside the reserves. In practice, this meant that over 70% of the population had only 7%, later 13%, of land at their disposal. Predominantly burisch large-scale farmers thus got rid of competition and many small black African farmers lost their livelihoods and became impoverished (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 62). With the Mines and Work Act of 1922, a 'colour bar' was established as 'horizontal apartheid' in the sense of a ban on professional advancement in economic life. Certain, more demanding jobs, initially in mining in particular, were reserved for white South Africans (job reservation), or from a certain level onwards there were concrete quota specifications for the employment relationship: 'black to white', with clear preference for whites (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 63; cf. Hefeker/Menck 2002, p. 29).

After the victory of the Boer party in 1948, intervention in labour market policy increased further. The Boer government pursued an 'Afrikaanerisation' of public life and everywhere it could, it filled the posts with Boers. The areas of the bureaucracy and the civil service were considerably expanded to serve as a source of employment for white South Africans with low levels of education who would otherwise have to compete with blacks in finding work (cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 73). In addition, in the 1950s the above-mentioned 'colour barrier' was significantly tightened and extended to all industrial sectors (cf. Dadalos/Chronologie p. 1).

The above-mentioned Bantu education policy supported the labour market policy. Low quality education for black South Africans led to the emergence of a 'disposal mass' in the lower labour market segments t: as domestic servants/gardeners, as agricultural labourers on the burisch farms, as well as in hazardous jobs in mining and as unskilled labour in the factories. The overall number of skilled black South African workers was very low, as skilled worker diplomas and certificates were only awarded to white South Africans (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 36; cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 63). Black South Africans were further discriminated against by significantly worse working conditions, and lower wages for equal work (cf. Hefeker/Menck 2002, p. 29). In addition, the prohibition of union organisation and the exercise of the right to strike for black South African workers enabled their almost unrestricted exploitation (cf. Dadalos/Economy, p. 2).

Discrimination in economic life led to an increasing division between South Africans who tended to be rich, white, and poor, black South Africans, among whom about 60% did not reach the subsistence level (cf. Thobejane 2013, p.4 Hagemann 1995, p. 695).

In 1998, a law was passed (Employment Equity Act) to make the economic policy sector more 'demographically representative'. The correction of the previous discrimination against the black population consisted, among other things, in the replacement of many positions in the civil service by black South Africans and in the targeted preferential treatment of black employees in hiring in business enterprises (so-called positive discrimination 'affirmative action'; cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 40ff.). These measures were expanded by the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE, 2003, 2014), with the aim of specifically bringing black South Africans into

management positions in companies and changing the ownership structure in their favour (e.g. fixed quotas for companies regarding the participation of non-whites) (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 40; cf. Dieterich 2017, p. 98). However, the BEE led to considerable distortions: A very small percentage of the population (including above all the political elite of the ANC under President Zuma) became rich very quickly through an expanded corruption network (cf. Kappel 2019, p. 55; cf. Hagemann 2018, p. 120ff.) [5]Consequently, at the top of the hierarchy, alongside white South Africans, there is now also a 'small black South African elite' (cf. Fröhlich 2019, p. 3; cf. Breytenbach 2009, p. 3ff.; cf. Zentella 2010, p. 331). However, the black, growing middle class has incomes that are often so low that people quickly fall back below the poverty line during economic slumps, such as the corona pandemic (cf. Kappel 2019, p. 53). The situation is particularly problematic for the unemployed.[6] Although these are currently predominantly black South Africans, the number of white unemployed South Africans is also steadily increasing as a result of 'affirmative action'. Already in the pre-Corona period, 29% of the population was unemployed and among 15-24 year olds even about 50%. Due to the Corona pandemic, both figures reached record highs: Total unemployment is about 35% and youth unemployment is described as a 'ticking time bomb', amounting to 66.6%. Unemployment naturally results in poverty; specifically, more than 50% of South Africans live below the national poverty line (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 42; cf. BMZ 2023b, p. 2).South Africa's economic outlook is not optimistic at present: the government has hardly promoted small and medium-sized enterprises and hardly any new jobs have been created. As a result of apartheid's Bantu education policy, South Africa suffers from a shortage of skilled workers. Management positions are often filled by insufficiently qualified black South Africans (cf. Kappel 2019, p. 55; cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 42). The economy has also been suffering from an energy crisis for 15 years, which manifests itself in 'load shedding', i.e. the daily, hourly shutdown of electricity is part of everyday life in South Africa (cf. Lüdecke 2023; cf. Putsch 2022).

[5] President Zuma was forced to prematurely relinquish his presidency in 2018 and was brought before a court, cf. Wright 2021, p. 3f

[6] The special role of the church in combating unemployment is examined by van der Westhuizen/Swart (cf. Westhuizen/Swart 2015).

It is true that South Africa currently occupies 6th place in the ranking of African countries with the highest GDP per capita. Nevertheless, the legacy of apartheid, the division between rich and poor, has not diminished; in fact, inequality has increased under ANC governments: The World Bank's Gini index is 63.3%, making South Africa one of the countries with the greatest income and especially wealth inequality (cf. Urmersbach 2022b; cf. Fröhlich 2019, p. 2). According to the World Inequality Report of 2022, 85.7% of wealth is in the hands of 10% of the population, with 1% of the richest owning 55% of the wealth alone. On the other hand, 50% of the poorest own 'less than nothing', i.e. they have debt (-2.4% of total wealth; cf. Chanel et al. 2022, p. 217). This now holds considerable potential for social conflict and unrest.

### 2.3 Settlement policy consequences of apartheid

The 'foundation stone' for the spatial separation of the races was laid in 1950 with the Population Registration Act, as mentioned above. With the Group Areas Act of 1950, all ethnic groups were assigned their own residential districts and the first forced relocations took place in order to 'segregate' the citizens (cf. Bakker et al. 2019, p. 7).

In 1959, a turning point in the apartheid concept took place. With the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act and the so-called homeland policy, ten separate territories (homelands) were formed for the black South Africans with approx. 13% of the total state area, which in the government's conception were to exist as independent small states. Basically, however, the aim was to create a white nation state in South Africa (so-called great apartheid). Between 1960 and 1983, more than 3.5 million black South Africans were forcibly resettled in the homelands, mainly from the big cities, industrial areas and prosperous agricultural areas. In the next step, all black South Africans (approx. 25 million) were deprived of their South African citizenship with the Black Homelands Citizenship Act of 1971 and instead granted citizenship of one of the homelands (cf. Bakker et al. 2019, p. 7; cf. Dadalos/Homelands p.2).

In reality, the homelands were not 'viable' because they were established on economically backward areas of the former native reservations.[7] In order to be able to feed their families, about 90% of the men of working age were employed in 'white South Africa'. Due to the great distance to the homelands, a migrant labour system was established: the workers worked several months a year and only visited their families left behind for a few weeks. This led to the destruction of family structures; the children often grew up without fathers, but also partly without mothers, who also 'migrated' to the cities (cf. Hagemann 1995, p. 694). During their working hours, the workers lived in so-called townships. Townships were low-cost residential areas built on the outskirts of the cities and isolated from the white urban areas, i.e. usually simple corrugated iron settlements (cf. Findley/Ogbu 2011, p. 1). There was hardly any infrastructure, electricity and water supply, and there was a lack of hygiene. Due to poverty and hunger, and because of the different population groups to which the residents belonged, conflicts were frequent. The townships thus became a 'hotbed' of violence and crime (cf. Bürk et al. 2019, p. 7).

With the end of apartheid, spatial racial segregation was formally abolished; the homelands were incorporated into nine provinces of South Africa. However, the spatial structures of the townships have survived to this day and are still inhabited, mainly by urban black South Africans. Living conditions have improved over the years thanks to the government's infrastructure programmes; there is a better supply of electricity and water, and houses in the townships have been renovated or newly built. However, the problem of expensive or long (often more than 1.5 hours a day by public transport) journeys to work remains (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 39f.).

The population density in the townships continued to increase after 1994. One reason for this is high labour-oriented migration from the former homelands. After 1994, strong, often illegal immigration from neighbouring African countries can also be observed. This immigration leads to the emergence of informal, often spontaneously founded settlements, in public areas such as parks, sometimes also within the townships or in their vicinity. Living conditions in the informal settlements are problematic, i.e. there is often no electricity or water supply, there is no waste disposal and there is a lack of sanitary facilities. Unemployment is very high

[7] Schepers describes the homelands, or 'Bantustans', as imaginary, cf. Schepers 2013, p. 3.

here and immigrants are mostly employed in the informal sector (street vendors, day labourers) (cf. Bürk et. al. 2019, p. 6f. and p. 12f.).

One of the biggest social problems - as a result of social inequality and lack of opportunities - is crime in all its forms: On average, 56 murders are registered every day and 22,000 house break-ins per year (cf. March 2019, p. 4). In addition, xenophobia is growing among the poor and there are frequent brutal attacks on immigrants (cf. BMZ 2023c, p. 2; Jaecke 2022, p.2).

Primarily out of fear of rampant crime, so-called 'gated communities' emerged after 1994. These are closed residential areas that are walled or fenced in and equipped with security cameras and alarm systems as well as 24-hour security. The gated communities often have very high living standards: detached houses, some of which have their own gardens and pools; the infrastructure is very well developed, right down to their own restaurants, parks and sports facilities. In the immediate vicinity there are a variety of shopping facilities, doctors, hospitals (cf. Bürk et al. 2019, p. 7ff.; cf. March 2019, p. 4ff.). The houses in Gates Communities are often quite expensive, and thus basically reserved for the upper income classes; approx. 82% of the residents are white South Africans. [8]Finally, it should be noted that the segregation of the population has not decreased after 1994. It has only changed due to the socio-economic status of the inhabitants (cf. Bürk et al. 2019, p. 7; March 2019, p. 9f.). To put it pointedly, in South Africa today "race (...) has been replaced by class." (Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 42; cf. The guardian 2019, p. 2, translation by the author).

## 3 Conclusion and outlook

With the formation of a new government under Nelson Mandela, a constitution was adopted in 1996 that is considered one of the most progressive in the world. Its basic principles include the protection of women, equality and anti-racism (cf. Pabst 2008, p. 121). The reality in South Africa, however, is different and much more complex. On the one hand, South Africa is considered to be exemplary democratic with regard to the equality of women in political terms; since the last elections in 2019, for

[8] For example, the monthly fees for maintenance costs and security measures of the gated community alone are comparable to the minimum wage of a domestic worker, cf. March 2019, p. 10f.

example, 46% of MPs are female. On the other hand, unemployment is highest among young women and in family structures many women suffer from 'toxic masculinity', i.e. they are often subordinate to men and thus become victims of domestic violence (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 43).

Nowadays, not much has remained of the optimistic spirit of optimism from the Mandela era. The extent of nepotism, corruption and enrichment under subsequent ANC governments was so extensive that there is talk of 'state capture' (cf. Wilke-Launer 2019, p. 45). The increasing impoverishment to the point of starvation of low-income earners in the Corona pandemic (cf. Sibeko 2021, p. 2) led to the radicalisation of society and the number of violent protests and riots increased (cf. Bühler 2021, p. 1f.).

But race relations have also deteriorated. The black South African population feels abandoned by the government and partly transfers this resentment to the white South African population; the number of assaults is increasing. White South Africans have felt increasingly marginalised in public life and deprived of career advancement opportunities since 1994 due to the governments' 'affirmative action'. Many have experienced economic decline and there are also many white beggars at the road junctions these days. Since the abolition of apartheid, there has therefore been an increasing emigration of white South Africans (cf. Pabst 2008, p. 148f.; cf. Courier 2019, p. 2). The complaint that "there used to be too little white and now there is too little black" (Pabst 2008, p.150, translation of the author) leads to the statement: "Apartheid today is against whites" (Courier 2019, p. 1).

The land reform, which should redistribute 30% of the economically usable land in favour of the black population, is currently a 'powder keg'. It is causing resentment among the black population because it is progressing too slowly. White South African farmers fear for their livelihoods as they fear being expropriated without compensation (cf. BMZ 2023b, p. 2; cf. Kappel 2019, p. 54).

Finally, I would like to quote from de Klerk's speech on the 25th anniversary of the abolition of apartheid in South Africa:

"South Africa today is not the 'rainbow nation' of a nation united in diversity that apartheid fighter Nelson Mandela aspired to. (...) In the meantime, however, the policy of positive discrimination in favour of the blacks has gone too far and runs the risk of being racism with other signs. (...) However, the majority in the country is not racist and has internalised that all South Africans are in the same boat. Anything that damages this boat will cause us all to sink." (Zeit 2019, p. 2, translation of the author).

But where is South Africa heading today - in relation to this example? No one knows for sure. Nor do I.

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